Torâh | Haphtârâh | Âmar Ribi Yᵊhoshua | Mᵊnorat ha-Maor |
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Setting: ca. B.C.E. 1427. Location: Area of Shit•imꞋ & Har Nᵊvo, east of NᵊharꞋ ha-Yar•deinꞋ, opposite Yᵊrikh•oꞋ (see map below: 31° 46' N, 35° 43' E). |
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Kaaba Square, Mecca, Saudi Arabia; Black stone is at leftmost corner of Kaaba, which stands about 15m (50') high x 11m (35') wide in the center of square. |
Whereas Arabs believe that they are the faithful bearers of the faith of Avᵊrâ•hâmꞋ, Yi•shᵊm•â•eilꞋ and Ei•sauꞋ (Ë•dōmꞋ), the historical documentation proves—and even Arab historians and scholars concede—that, before Muhammad (6th century C.E.), Arabs practiced the blatant idolatry of their Egyptian matriarch, Hâ•gârꞋ (mother of Yi•shᵊm•â•eilꞋ ).
The only documentation from antiquity is Ta•na"khꞋ, which documents that Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ, alone, remained faithful to the tenets of úÌåÉøÈä, which developed orally through Avᵊrâ•hâmꞋ, Yi•tzᵊkhâqꞋ and Ya•a•qovꞋ—who was renamed Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ. When Arab Muslims deny the Authority of Ta•na"khꞋ they deny the Authority of their only documented connection to Avᵊrâ•hâmꞋ! When Arab Muslims contradict Ta•na"khꞋ, they demonstrate that their oxymoronic claims of Displacement Theology—either Ta•na"khꞋ or their contradiction, one, has to be wrong—are self-evidently, self-proven, false!!!
Kaaba: black stone. See man bending down at the corner, with black strap across back, kissing the black stone. |
These tenets of Tor•âhꞋ were codified by Mosh•ëhꞋ on Har Sin•aiꞋ (ca. B.C.E. 1466) and interpreted thereafter exclusively by Bat•eiꞋ-Din established by Mosh•ëhꞋ (Shᵊm•otꞋ 18.24-26). Thus, Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ had been following codified úÌåÉøÈä, as interpreted authoritatively by the Bibically-ordained Beit-Din (i.e. Oral Law), for two millennia before Muhammed was born!
While Muhammad appears to have been strong against idolatry in Taif (100km east of Mecca), any etymological investigation into the term Al•lahꞋ (see link) quickly exposes some idolatrous oversights in his home town of Mecca. Attempts to deny idolatrous roots of Al•lahꞋ, based on the name being an Arab cognate of the Hebrew Eil is in error, first of all, gramatically. Eil is a mysterious abbreviation that leaves something out between the singular and the plural; the plural being ël•oh•imꞋ. A reconstruction of the excised name that would properly parallel Al•lahꞋ would be something like àÃìÉä. But Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ had periodic apostasies into idolatry. àÃìÉä was excised from the Hebrew vocabulary because it was idolatrous—like its Arab counterpart, Al•lahꞋ! Being the Arabic counterpart of the idol àÃìÉä is self-indicting.
Mecca – black alleged meteorite stone (see a suggested Christian Διαθηκη Καινη (NT) allusion to a similar meteorite in its book of Acts 19:23-36). This black stone is located on an east corner of the Kaaba. |
Not trusting on-line "encyclopedias" that have proven riddled with glaring errors and are, in reality, nothing more than popular consensus of the most vociferous axe-grinders, I confirmed the following through the consistent confirmation of a number of sources, ignoring Christian sites with a religious axe to grind. One of the better documented sites is www.islam-watch.org. The Greek historian Herodotus, writing in B.C.E. 5th century, considers her the equivalent of Aphrodite:"The Assyrians call Aphrodite Mylitta, the Arabians al-ilat, and the Persians Mithra" (Histories I:131). It cannot be ignored here that both Displacement Theologies, Christianity and Islam, share their origins in the worship of Mithra!!!
Mecca Kaaba black stone. Some researchers associate the shape of the black stone and silver mount with the vulva of the original Arabian |
According to Herodotus, the ancient Arabians believed in only two gods: "They believe in no other gods except Dionysus and the Heavenly Aphrodite; and they say that they wear their hair as Dionysus does his, cutting it round the head and shaving the temples [which is why Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ was prohibited from wearing their hair this way]. They call Dionysus, Orotalt; and Aphrodite, Al-ilat." (Histories III:38). According to Kitab al-Asnam (the Book of Idols) by Hisham b. al-Kalbi, the pre-Islamic Arabs believed Al-ilat, which morphed into Al-lah, resided in the Kaaba and also had a stone statue form in the sanctuary. Thus, the Kaaba in Mecca is, in historical fact, a pagan temple of Al-ilat / Allah, which the Arabs used to circumambulate; NOT a "mosque" built by Abraham, as Arabs believe. Stated simply, Mohammad took a page out of the Hellenist-Christian syncretism; just as "Apostle St. Paul" the Apostate and Hellenist Christians had remolded some Judaic ideas into their native mythologies, likewise Mohammad remolded some of both Judaic and Christian ideas into the Arab mythological tradition.
Islam Mecca Kaaba Muslims kissing black stone |
The Quraysh [the tribe into which Muhammad was born] were wont to circumambulate the Kaabah and say:
By al-ilatand al-Uzza,
And al-Manah, the third idol besides.
Verily they are the most exalted females
Whose intercession is to be sought.
These were also called "the Daughters of Al•lahꞋ," and were supposed to intercede before god.
Thus, the Islamic ritual of circumambulating the Kaaba is an extension of earlier Arab idolatry.
B. al-Kalbi writes (N.A. Faris 1952, pp. 14-15): Her custody was in the hands of the Banu-Attab ibn-Malik of the Thaqif, who had built an edifice over her. The Quraysh [Muhammad's tribe], as well as all the Arabs, were wont to venerate al-ilat. So much for Arab claims of bearing "the true faith" from Av•râ•hâmꞋ, Yi•tzᵊkhâqꞋ and Ya•a•qovꞋ.
Thus, etymologically, Al•lahꞋ is certainly NOT equivalent to, lᵊ-hav•dilꞋ, é--ä.
However, ëloh•imꞋ, it must be remembered, means "gods." This is not identical to é--ä either!
To translate the issue into consistent English: For Arab (and other) Muslims, the god is the god (or stated as better known: "there is no the god but the god"); but for Yᵊhud•imꞋ , Hearken Israel! é--ä is our god(s), é--ä is a Singularity.
To translate the issue into consistent transliterated Arabic: For Arabs, Allah is Allah (or stated as better known: "there is no Allah but Allah"); but for Yᵊhud•imꞋ , Hearken Israel! é--ä is our allah, é--ä is a Singularity.
To translate the issue into consistent transliterated Hebrew: For Arabs, ël•oh•imꞋ is ël•oh•imꞋ ; but for Yᵊhud•imꞋ : Shᵊm•aꞋ Yi•sᵊ•râ•eilꞋ é--ä is our ël•oh•imꞋ , é--ä is a Singularity."
To translate the issue into consistent Christian: YeshꞋ "u is our ël•oh•imꞋ ; but for Yᵊhud•imꞋ : Shᵊm•aꞋ Yi•sᵊ•râ•eilꞋ , é--ä is our ël•oh•imꞋ , é--ä is a Singularity." (So, no, despite whatever protestations, claims and beliefs, Christians do not worship the same ël•oh•imꞋ as Yᵊhud•imꞋ !)
There is no capitalization in Hebrew. Thus, the apparent distinction between Ël•oh•imꞋ and ëloh•imꞋ is an artificial convenience of translation of the single Hebrew term . The importance of the Shᵊm•aꞋ is that it declares that, for Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ, é--ä subsumes the ëloh•imꞋ (Ël•oh•imꞋ) / Al•lahꞋ (Allah) / gods (God)—"é--ä is our Ël•oh•imꞋ, é--ä is a Singularity" (Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 6.4).
Therefore, it is accurate to state that Al•lahꞋ ≡ ëloh•imꞋ ≡ gods, all of which—for Yᵊhud•imꞋ —are subsumed by é--ä but none of which are equivalent to é--ä. The bottom line, therefore, is that Ël•oh•imꞋ ≡ Allah ≡ G-d are only permitted when referring to their supersession and subsumption by é--ä. In all other instances, they are idolatrous and their pronunciation is prohibited. Thus, like Ël•oh•imꞋ, Allah and God can be used of é--ä. On the other hand, if Al•lahꞋ is used in denial of é--ä the Ël•oh•imꞋ of Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ, or god refers to Jesus, then it is idolatrous and prohibited.
This same encyclopedia states—wrongly—that Al•lahꞋ is the term used by Tei•mân•iꞋ Jews. I've been attending an Orthodox Tei•mân•iꞋ Beit ha-KᵊnësꞋët since around 1996 and I've never heard the word "Al•lahꞋ" once, though I've heard "Ël•oh•imꞋ" countless times and have countless times read "Ël•oh•imꞋ" in úÌåÉøÈä in this Orthodox Tei•mân•iꞋ Beit ha-KᵊnësꞋët.
Teimân•imꞋ do use the term Al•lahꞋ when singing of é--ä in Arabic. However, Teimân•imꞋ do not substitute Al•lahꞋ for Ël•oh•imꞋ in their liturgy, reading úÌåÉøÈä, conversation or anywhere else. So it is wrong to state that "Al•lahꞋ is the [emphasis added] term used by Tei•mân•iꞋ Jews."
I know from my own research that "Al•lahꞋ" is not found in the Hebrew Bible and, checking a number of references where the Aramaic equivalent of Ël•oh•imꞋ should be found in the Aramaic Targum (lacking an Aramaic concordance), I found, instead, the abbreviation éé in the Aramaic Targum. The Dictionary of the Targumim, Talmud Bavli, Talmud Yerushalmi and Midrashic Literature by Marcus Jastrow (p. 67), which covers both Hebrew and Aramaic, offers only the Biblical Hebrew fem. form àÁìÀÉäÌÇ, the complete fem. noun form cognate of the abbreviated àÅì. the plural of which is àìäéí (Ël•oh•imꞋ or ëloh•imꞋ—the distinguishing capital doesn't exist in Hebrew and is strictly an interpretation of translations).
To resolve this contradiction authoritatively, I phoned my friend from my Orthodox Tei•mân•iꞋ Beit ha-KᵊnësꞋët, Dr. Yᵊhud•âhꞋ Amir, whose Ph.D. is in Hebrew Literature, specialized in Tei•mân•iꞋ history and literature. His response was that the Teimân•imꞋ refer to Al•lahꞋ only in the Arabic translations. Yᵊhud•âhꞋ confirmed for me that, indeed, it isn't found in the Aramaic Targums, only in the Arabic translations. The statement in the encyclopedia is a non sequitur equivalent to assuming that when úÌåÉøÈä is translated into English the term "god" is used, therefore, god is the name most English-speaking Jews use as the proper noun for "deity." Apostate "Jews" aside, as any visit to an Orthodox Beit ha-KᵊnësꞋët in any English-speaking country in the world will confirm, no Orthodox English-speaking Jews consider god—or Al•lahꞋ—as an acceptable substitute for Ël•oh•imꞋ in prayer or liturgy, even in Arabic-speaking countries. One must also recognize that when a Yemenite Jew refers to the Yemenite language, that would not refer to the language of the liturgy and prayer of Yemenite Jews but, rather, the language of their country of origin—the Arab country of Yemen and its Yemenite (Arab, not Jewish) = Arabic language.
In fact, the Teimân•imꞋ recognize only the Hebrew Bible as authoritative and the Aramaic as illuminating the Hebrew. The Arabic is no more authoritative than an English translation or Spanish or French. Nor is "Al•lahꞋ" any more genuine among Teimân•imꞋ than the English, Spanish or French terms. The only conclusion that is legitimate is that, for obvious reasons, most Teimân•imꞋ are familiar with the Arabic language rather than English, Spanish, French, Russian, etc. Consequently, citing the Teimân•imꞋ usage as legitimizing "Al•lahꞋ" is an ignorant misrepresentation. Outside of communication with Arabs or profane conversation among primarily Arabic speakers, Arabic-speaking Jews do NOT refer to the deity as Al•lahꞋ and the only proper term for "deity" among ALL Jews in liturgy and religious usage is only the Hebrew Ël•oh•imꞋ, no other term! (There are, of course, many synonyms in the Bible—none of which are Al•lahꞋ or god. The only Name for Ël•oh•imꞋ is é--ä. Other "names" are, more accurately, descriptive metonyms.)
The prohibitions against mingling species in this week's pâ•râsh•âhꞋ, symbolizing the assimilation posed by Bil•âmꞋ and augmented by the úÌåÉøÈä principle of Havdâl•âhꞋ, most certainly applies to not mingling é--ä, the Ëlohei Yisrâeil, with any other god.
The Bible refers over 200 times to é--ä being the àÁìÉäÅé éÄùÒÀøÈàÅì
By contrast, the Bible NEVER refers to, lᵊ-hav•dilꞋ, Al•lahꞋ, any god of Yi•shᵊm•â•eilꞋ , any god of Ei•sauꞋ—therefore not any "Al•lahꞋ" of the Arabs—or any god of gentiles – including Christians.
Never does the Bible refer to é--ä as the àÁìÉäÅé éÄùÑÀîÈòÅàì, the àÁìÉäÅé òÅùÒÈåÌ or the like!
If, as one encyclopedia reports, the Quran defines Al•lahꞋ as "the Al•lahꞋ" of Av•râ•hâmꞋ, Yi•tzᵊkhâqꞋ and Ya•a•qovꞋ, then this presents Arabs and Islam with a number of internal contradictions. First, the sole originating documentation of Av•râ•hâmꞋ, Yi•tzᵊkhâqꞋ and Ya•a•qovꞋ is úÌåÉøÈä.
Muhammed's Overnight Journey By Horseback From Mecca – To Medina (not éÀøåÌùÑÈìÇéÄí)? Or A Silly Magical Flying Horse Fable? |
If Arabs hold that úÌåÉøÈä is true, then Arabs must accept all of it. Alternately, if úÌåÉøÈä is not held to be true then Arabs and Islam have no more basis for their existence of, much less claimed connection to, "Ibrahim, Iskhaq and Yaqub" (much less their relationship to them) than Christian gentiles have to Av•râ•hâmꞋ, Yi•tzᵊkhâqꞋ and Ya•a•qovꞋ, rendering Islam nothing but a second order (after Christianity!) displacement theology mythology lacking any historical authenticity (which corroborates magical fables of Muhammad flying off into the sky on a magical horse from "a far place"—understood by all Muslims for centuries, until 1948, as Medina, not éÀøåÌùÑÈìÇéÄí).
The counter charge, that Jews believe in a Cecile B. DeMille magical "parting of the sea" is completely fair and logical. However, the Nᵊtzâr•imꞋ accept the account within the constraints of science and physics, rejecting magical fables – in the knowledge that the Immutable (Ma•lâkh•iꞋ 3.6; "not capricious", Einstein) Creator does not contradict the Perfect Laws He Himself authored that govern His universe. Fantastic tales of magic partings of the sea and magical horses are the product of ignorant human believers in fables; a simple continuation of Akkadian, Sumerian, Babylonian and Canaanite idolatry!!! It is logically impossible – irrational, out of touch with reality and insane – to think that such contradictions emanated from an Immutable Creator.
Accepting úÌåÉøÈä as true invalidates the úÌåÉøÈä-rejecting and Islamic claim of supersession by the Quran and Islam. Therefore, the definition of Al•lahꞋ reduces to whether it is defined by etymology or its proponents—Islam. If the latter then Al•lahꞋ is a contradiction of, lᵊ-hav•dilꞋ, úÌåÉøÈä and é--ä of úÌåÉøÈä.
Further, if the description reported in the encyclopedia is correct, then the inclusion of Ya•a•qovꞋ in the Quranic definition is key—since úÌåÉøÈä renames Ya•a•qovꞋ to Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ and defines the bᵊrit with Ya•a•qovꞋ and Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ—NOT Ei•sauꞋ (or Yi•shᵊm•â•eilꞋ ) and, therefore, not with their descendents, the Arabs!!!
Moreover, the Ël•oh•imꞋ of Israel is defined in the Bible (úÌåÉøÈä), which, lᵊ-hav•dilꞋ, Islam and Arabs reject and contravene. Therefore, Islam, and Al•lahꞋ as defined by Islam (or etymologically), are the opposite of, lᵊ-hav•dilꞋ, Ël•oh•imꞋ of Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ and the principle of Havdâl•âhꞋ prohibits mingling the two antitheses. Like god, which derives from an ancient pagan deity of fortune and is most often used to refer to Jesus, Al•lahꞋ, when not referring to the Creator-Singularity, is a false deity, an idol.
Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ is diametrically different from the goy•imꞋ, whether Muslim, Christian or Arab. Av•râ•hâmꞋ, Yi•tzᵊkhâqꞋ and Ya•a•qovꞋ displaced ALL of the "Ël•oh•imꞋ" of the goy•imꞋ with the recognition of the Omnipotent Singularity of é--ä. This is summarized in the opening sentence of our Shᵊm•aꞋ (Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 6.4):
"Hearken, Israel: é--ä is our ëloh•imꞋ, é--ä is a Singularity."
Carmel Grapes |
This week's pâ•râsh•âhꞋ prohibits mixing plantings in a vineyard (i.e., with grapes; Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 22.9).
Chronologically irrelevant medieval European misconceptions aside, the perspective of early Jews concerning mixing species is reflected in the statements of Philo and Josephus, that "the conjunction of dissimilar things" is unnatural (Josephus, Ant. 4.229) and, therefore, conflicts with the order of creation, inflicting "too great a burden on the earth" (Philo, Spec. 4.211). "The opinion that new species could be created by grafting belongs to agricultural folklore, and also to Greco-Roman 'science,' and from there entered into rabbinic literature" (Mixed Species, EJ, 12.171).
In the first century C.E., úÌåÉøÈä and the rabbis related to all aspects of life, from eating to socializing to business dealings and politics. Judaism has always been a practice, the daily ò"ã of life; never a mere theological exercise of vacuous ritual, recitation of mystical (magical) incantations or even a set of beliefs. The rabbinic record in Tal•mudꞋ, however, clearly shows that the rabbis also had strong interests in another consideration: the whole idea of mixing, which is all linked to symbolizing the assimilation of Bil•âmꞋ and ãÌÀáÇø ôÌÀòåÉø.
Even weaving of mixed materials and wearing fabric of linen mixed with wool was prohibited, so important was this principle – for the laity. Ko•han•imꞋ, by contrast, were instructed that their uniforms mix linen and wool! The Ko•han•imꞋ prohibition against mixing was likely driven primarily at the behest of Mosh•ëhꞋ, and probably continued receiving increasingly greater emphasis by successors, due to its complicating of a well documented major problem in the ancient community of Yi•sᵊrâ•eilꞋ that is rarely mentioned, in this connection, in the literature: taxation! When mixed, does one tax fabric or a garment at the wool rate or the linen rate? Lease a pre-crop field at the vineyard rate or the lintel rate? The Hellenization of the Kᵊhun•âhꞋ in B.C.E. 171 magnified the Ko•han•imꞋ preoccupation with this more worldly-minded consideration in connection with mixing species: now Roman-defined taxation. In their collaborations with the taxation defined by the (Hellenist) Roman occupiers, this suggests two things:
there had been an original distinction between the right and responsibility of ordinary Yi•sᵊrâ•eilꞋ versus the Ko•han•imꞋ to determine the bounds of natural, unnatural and the limits of mixing them; and
in addition to the previously defined unnaturalness of mixing, the Pᵊrush•imꞋ (rabbis), who filled the vacuum left by the Ko•han•imꞋ after the destruction of the Beit ha-Mi•qᵊdâshꞋ in 70 C.D., developed, or ramped up the emphasis on, its possible ramifications relative to intermarriage and assimilation.
The ancient tradition of taxation in the Jewish community derived from the servitudes, levies and obligations imposed in the Biblical period by the king; which included tithing the fields, vineyards and flocks (Taxation, EJ, 15.840). The reputation of the taxman goes way back for good cause. During the early period of Roman occupation, Jewish îåÉëÀñÄéí, rendered "publicans" in the NT, were regarded as assimilated and traitorous tax-gougers in the employ of the Roman occupiers (Ma•sëkꞋët Sunedrion 25b).
The îåÉëÀñÄéí not only collected taxes in their booths, they had to have some way of knowing how much tax to demand; and it is well documented that their demands were outrageously exorbitant, gouging their fellow Jews. By making the îåÉëÀñÄéí collect taxes plus their personal income from the Jews, the Romans tried to avoid being the "bad guy." The îåÉëÀñÄéí had to pay the Romans a basic tax on behalf of every Jew. What the îåÉëÀñÄéí collected over and above what they had to pay the Romans was all profit; and they profited enormously.
Taxes could only be maximized by keeping records. How many fields did each Israeli own? How large were the fields? What crop was grown on the plot? Different crops yielded different prices, dictating different taxes. And there is a hitch. If a vineyard should bring in a certain income (whether it actually did or not wasn't relevant to the tax man), then the tax could be assessed. Perhaps the land wasn't suitable for an expensive crop and only a cheaper crop could be grown. The tax could be assessed accordingly. But if a farmer mixed crops, well, who could tell how much of which would grow; so, he could pay full taxes on both crops. The taxman wasn't going to get into infinite negotiations with every farmer about how much of this crop was planted, how much survived and its yield and price versus how much of that crop, how much that crop detracted from the yield of other crop, etc. You planted two crops. You paid full taxes for both crops and move along—or, don't mix the crops in the first place. Next.
The îåÉëÀñÄéí adapted the greedy pattern developed earlier by the corrupt Hellenist (Roman sympathizing) Kohan•imꞋ (pseudo-Tzᵊdoq•imꞋ known as the Ko•han•eiꞋ hâ-RëshꞋa) who controlled—under the supervision of the Hellenist goy•imꞋ occupiers—the Beit-ha-Mi•qᵊdâshꞋ. The îåÉëÀñÄéí adopted, for determining taxes owed, the same formula which the Kohan•imꞋ had reckoned as çÅøÆí, e.g. Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 22.9, where the connotation of "banned from profane use" is mistranslated as "forbidden." Originally, it wasn't "forbidden" because it was mixed, it was designated çÅøÆí whereby the ownership of the crop was transferred to the corrupt Hellenist pseudo-Tzᵊdoq•imꞋ Ko•han•eiꞋ hâ-RëshꞋa; lost to the farmer.
In summary, the condemnations of mixing, although originating in pragmatic agricultural realities, seem to have evolved into far more mundane considerations of materialism and greed, financial and political considerations, rather than theological principles or symbolisms. This also seems to correlate with the exemptions, where taxation (and attempting to cheat the Romans, often with dire results) would be less innate, as well as correlating with the introduction of rabbinic prohibitions against evading Roman taxes (Sem. 2.9; Taxation, EJ, 15.842). The lack of coherent theological development of the ideas recorded by Philo and Josephus bolsters the conclusion that the primary considerations were worldly—financial and political, specifically, taxation. This also predicts that, since the relationship of mixing to tax assessment was well-grounded in úÌåÉøÈä, there would be no negative theological writings blaming the prohibition against mixed plantings on Jewish îåÉëÀñÄéí, who knew everything that went on in the Jewish community, much less blaming the prohibition against mixing plantings on Roman taxation. This is reflected, for example, in the inquiry by the Pᵊrush•imꞋ to their fellow RibꞋi, Yᵊho•shuꞋa Bën-Yo•seiphꞋ, whether to pay taxes to the Romans (The Nᵊtzârim Reconstruction of Hebrew Matitᵊyâhu (NHM, in English) 22.15-22), which, while clearly evidencing Jewish loathing of both the îåÉëÀñÄéí and Roman taxes, suggests no blame of assessments based on mixed plantings.
The implications of building on an initial premise of financial and taxation principles as opposed to theological misconceptions cannot be overstated. Medieval European taxonomies of plants and animals are riddled with inaccuracies and misconceptions; and rabbis likely will never consider admitting that these religious hypothesizers were wrong. For this ancient teaching to achieve compatibility with the modern reality of science and contemporary life, we must reconcile with modern science one of these two competing premises: [a] an incoherent pseudo-scientific rabbinic foundation that is intractably contradictory or [b] a financial basis (i.e., related to tax assessment). The former is impossible; it has led to incoherency, multiple contradiction and chaos. úÌåÉøÈä never expects the impossible from us. Logic, therefore, dictates developing Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ from the latter rather than the former.
(But beware throwing money away on heart-rending sob stories – con artists are more believable than actual needy persons.) |
This implies that considerations related to honesty in paying taxes and other financial dealings, applicable both inside and outside of Israel and inside and outside of the Jewish community in the Tᵊphutz•âhꞋ as well, would be the governing principles rather than theological speculations relative to erroneous and impossibly twisted taxonomies of both animals and plants. Understanding the priority to be on honesty in business rather than theological imaginings also meshes with Hi•leilꞋ's famous dictum that úÌåÉøÈä teaches one to treat his or her neighbor as you wish your neighbor to treat you; the rest is detail.
While keeping a great distance from assimilation and idolatry is certainly essential in all of its details, ritual is, nevertheless, subordinate to Hi•leilꞋ's description. Unfortunately, impossibly twisted taxonomies, which are intractably contradictory to modern science, ensures a growing need for traditionally trained—pseudo-scientific—rabbis to concoct new "mystical explanations" for an endless future of newly discovered contradictions to sell to future superstitious zombies, whose information is rigidly controlled by their Ultra-Orthodox rabbis, born every minute. In other words, continuing the current path leads to the rate of estrangement from úÌåÉøÈä continuing to skyrocket upward from the present 90+%!
As with other areas of Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ, reverting to Hi•leilꞋ's priority, working directly from the 1st-century situation (thus, skipping the misconceptions of medieval Europeanism), offers the only way forward in applying logic to interpret Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ relative to modern challenges of mixed species, from grafting orange and avocado trees to genetically engineering of animals, in vitro fertilization, stem cell research, cloning, etc. Today, for purposes of ma•asᵊr•otꞋ and taxes, these things are easily equated to monetary values, retaining the principle in a modern technical society while eliminating the prohibition of mixing of species that applied only to the taxation of an ancient agricultural society. Ethics in business dealings, coming to the fore, would then focus Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ on the important issues of our day; for example, scientifically defining the beginning of human life as a homo sapien rather than some principle based on an erroneous taxonomy that defines animals and plants of different species as being the same species or vice-versa. Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ would become relevant, returning to its rightful centrality, in modern Jewish life that it previously enjoyed in ancient Jewish life.
This ancient threshing floor is located at Kha•shᵊmon•ây•imꞋ.
A sturdy post was fixed in the center, to which an ox was chained or tied and led around the circle. As the chain or rope wound around the center post, the radius of the ox's path spiraled inward so that all of the wheat was threshed. Then the rope or chain was unwound from the center post and the cycle repeated.
The instructor at the Kha•shᵊmon•ây•imꞋ village shows the children of my daughter's "gan" (pre-school) field trip how the blades of this reconstructed ancient threshing sled (shown upside-down, blades exposed) cut the shafts of wheat.
As the ox walked its circuit, it pulled this sled, blades down, across the wheat, slicing the shafts into smaller pieces more suitable for winnowing, breaking the kernels of wheat loose in the process.
Rocks were placed on the sled, as needed, to give it the desired weight. A man's weight, or even that of a child, would have been far too heavy, ruining the blades. Whoever drove the ox had to walk, not ride the sled.
If your god can step in somethin', then you're an idolater guilty of anthropomorphism.
A hidden key is inherent in this passage. The oxymoron that the Omniscient might make such a mistake aside, how does this mi•tzᵊw•âhꞋ reconcile with the anti-anthropomorphic position of úÌåÉøÈä? This same question arises in connection with the passages that teach that Mosh•ëhꞋ "saw" é--ä face-to-Face. If the Face of é--ä is purely metaphoric, what, then, did Mosh•ëhꞋ see physically?
The latter is easiest to understand. The Hebrew ôÌÈðÄéí is often used in the figurative or metaphorical sense, just as "face" is in English ("face" of the ocean or earth, etc.). Mosh•ëhꞋ was shown to perceive and commune with—see—é--ä to a degree of reality that no one else had ever experienced. The non-physical may be perceived in the mind's eye ("he who has such eyes…"), but not literally seen by the physical eye; His Voice heard with the mind's ear ("he who has such ears…"), but not literally by the physical ear. Mosh•ëhꞋ was shown to "see" the "Face" of é--ä with his "spiritual eyes." Consider in this light the teaching "He who has eyes to see, let him see." Only the simpleton fails to "see" beyond the literal and physical (Tᵊhil•imꞋ 92.7).
The concern that é--ä would be kept away from the Israeli camp by the presence of excrement is not as obvious. Since it is axiomatic in úÌåÉøÈä that é--ä isn't physical, contamination by anything physical is an impossibility. Something non-physical cannot be smeared with anything physical. (Consider trying to imprison a thought, impale an idea, put a hat on a spirit or apply a coat of paint to a nëphꞋësh.)
The physical layout of the latrine area at Qum•rânꞋ, complemented by Josephus' description, illustrates the ancient toilet practice of Yi•sᵊrâ•eilꞋ (in contrast to the public, mixed-gender, long, open row of seats frequented by urban Hellenist goy•imꞋ).
Today, when you flush a toilet, the waste is removed from your presence and eyesight like the bluff at Qum•rânꞋ shielded the eyes of the community. But, just because it's in a nearby underground pipe, it is removed neither from the Omni-Presence nor Sight of é--ä. Has He not created everything? Is He not everywhere? Then it cannot be a contaminant to Him. Rather, it's a contamination to mortals, to each other.
Yet, if é--ä cannot be contaminated by anything physical, what can this passage imply? The answer provides a surprising link to the lesson of a min•yânꞋ derived from the smallest group of men who could forestall the destruction of Sᵊdom and A•mor•âhꞋ.
Excrement, being physical, can only contaminate and defile something also physical in the camp: another Israeli. However, the connection between contamination and that person's capacity to commune with é--ä is adversely affected; and it is the other Israelis in the camp who are the embodiments of é--ä in the camp—the min•yânꞋ. é--ä does, indeed, work through Israel—úÌåÉøÈä-observing Israelis. The degree to which this occurs is adversely affected by causing contamination and defilement to the other úÌåÉøÈä-observing Israelis in the camp – the min•yânꞋ.
Of course, this principle extends to the affects that transgressing any mi•tzᵊw•âhꞋ has on the rest of the min•yânꞋ—from keeping ùÑÇáÌÈú to ka•shᵊr•utꞋ.
.This ancient wheat mill is located in the Kha•shᵊmon•ây•imꞋ village. The upper millstone is the round wheel, which rests on the lower millstone. (Although the lower millstone would be difficult to move, it was still much easier and cheaper to move than to hew from scratch.) Much of the lower millstone is missing. Originally, it was a full circle, so that an ox or donkey could be chained or tied to the upper millstone wheel. Kernels of wheat were spread on the lower millstone and the ox or donkey was then led around the lower millstone, pulling the upper millstone wheel around to crush the wheat.
Emotional Feel-good; not holiness |
Pause and think back. Perhaps at a religious musical presentation? Listening to some revered religious speaker? Being at some revered religious site?
It should mightily scare you that devotees of other religions routinely feel equally holy, often far more so, for similar reasons—in their religion. Therefore, their religion is more right than yours? They are closer to god?
Feelings is the religion pursued by Christians; and Christianity beats úÌåÉøÈä hands down in producing feelings of perceived 'holiness,' as well as any other religious feelings one might desire. Christianity is emotion deriving from belief; no more, no less. Everything in Christianity—from the composition and order of liturgy to lighting and music leading up to the invitation—derives from the selectivity of interpretation introduced by Hellenist nihilism and orbits around the central motif of emotions.
Qum•rânꞋ scroll 4Q MMT demonstrates conclusively that 'holy' may only be understood as it is defined in úÌåÉøÈä — as ÷ÉãÆùÑ
First, therefore, ÷ÉãÆùÑ was, and remains, defined by úÌåÉøÈä—and úÌåÉøÈä defines ÷ÉãÆùÑ as doing (not talking or believing) one's utmost to be non-selectively obedient to úÌåÉøÈä! Thus, and this cannot be overemphasized, ÷ÉãÆùÑ is measured solely by one's practice of úÌåÉøÈä, not what one feels – or believes!
A side-effect of this is that it is a simple matter to see each person's daily practice, whether they practice úÌåÉøÈä or not – ùÑÇáÌÈú, ka•shᵊr•utꞋ, etc.
Contrary to Christian assertions, úÌåÉøÈä doesn't require any person to be perfect – not even the Mâ•shiꞋakh!
Rather, úÌåÉøÈä requires only that a person do his or her utmost to non-selectively keep the entirety of úÌåÉøÈä. When a person does his or her utmost to keep the whole of the mi•tzᵊw•otꞋ – i.e., non-selectively, including making tᵊshuv•âhꞋ for every violation of úÌåÉøÈä – then, in His khein and khësꞋëd, He bridges the slack with His provision of ki•purꞋ to transform us into a ÷ÉãÆùÑ person (until the next violation of úÌåÉøÈä).
So what does úÌåÉøÈä say (wa-Yi•qᵊr•âꞋ 19.2)? "÷ÀãÉùÑÄéí úÌÇøÀâÄéùÑåÌ"?
That's not what úÌåÉøÈä says at all! úÌåÉøÈä says (wa-Yi•qᵊr•âꞋ 19.2): "÷ÀãÉùÑÄéí úÌÄäÀéåÌ"!!!
Feelings, by contrast, include temptations, desires, lusts, personal satisfaction, insecurity, anger, guilt, nihilism, etc.—emotions.
Immediately following the mi•tzᵊw•âhꞋ to be ÷ÉãÆùÑ in wa-Yi•qᵊr•âꞋ 19.2 we find how úÌåÉøÈä understands the term ÷ÉãÆùÑ: "feel reverence for your mother and father" (verse 3)? "Don't feel like praying to idols" (verse 4)?
In (pâ•râsh•âhꞋ) Ki Teitzei we find examples like (22.1) "Don't feel like avoiding responsibility for your brother's property?" And (22.5) "Women shouldn't feel like wearing men's apparel" and "Men shouldn't feel like wearing women's apparel"?
úÌåÉøÈä is replete with 613 such examples—none of which mentions "feelings" and, by contrast, every one requires implementation in one's practice.
The Hebrew word for "feel" in this sense, the hiph•ilꞋ äøâéù (hirgish; he felt), isn't even found in Ta•na"khꞋ at all! That tells you something about the importance and priority of "feelings." The Hebrew verbs translated into English as "feel" have nothing to do with "feel" in this emotional sense. In other words, there is no Biblical support whatsoever for the "religious" pursuit of "feelings" in the guise of "holiness."
The "real deal" |
Worse, pursuit of "feelings" of "holiness," when they conflict with keeping úÌåÉøÈä, are, by the definition that RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa accepted and taught, the exact opposite of the Christian perception of "holy"! "Holiness" that rejects úÌåÉøÈä with Displacement Theology is defined by the úÌåÉøÈä—that RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa accepted and taught—as unholiness!!! Moreover, following the "spirit" of such "holiness" is then clearly seen to actually be the spirit of unholiness in the guise of "holiness"—Sâ•tânꞋ and demonic!!!
So, if ♫ You've lost that "holy feelin'" ♪ while doing your utmost to keep úÌåÉøÈä non-selectively—kal ha-kâ•vodꞋ. You're on the right track to being ÷ÉãÆùÑ instead of "feeling 'holy.'
22.5 – ìÉà-éÄäÀéÆä ëÀìÄé-âÆáÆø òÇì-àÄùÑÌÈä, åÀìÉà-éÄìÀáÌÇùÑ âÌÆáÆø ùÒÄîÀìÇú àÄùÑÌÈä; ëÌÄé úåÉòÂáÇú, é--ä àÁìÉäÆéêÈ ëÌÈì-òÉùÒÅä àÅìÌÆä:
The politically correct notion of embracing the sinner in acceptance while hating the sin is out of synch, and, therefore, not compatibile, with úÌåÉøÈä.
Yet, while the transgressor of úÌåÉøÈä cannot be considered apart from his or her practice, it also remains true that we must distinguish between the transgressor of úÌåÉøÈä and the temptation. This requires a consistent distinction between practice and temptation. The transgressor is defined by his or her practice, not by what tempts him or her.
This seeming paradox is easily understood. Whether an individual is tempted toward robbery, adultery, homosexuality or any other aveir•âhꞋ of úÌåÉøÈä, it is the practice, the succumbing to the temptation, not the temptation per se, which constitutes the úÌåÉòÅáÈä to é--ä.
Homosexuality is a good example. Many think of a homosexual as one who has homosexual desires andor tendencies, temptations toward the practice of homosexual behavior. Relative to úÌåÉøÈä, that's inaccurate. Again with logical consistency, the temptation by itself is not the to•eiv•âhꞋ. One who refuses to engage in homosexual behavior—or any of the other a•veir•otꞋ of úÌåÉøÈä—is innocent, irrespective of temptations. The person who is tempted by homosexual desires must not be stigmatized solely because of his or her desires. The person who practices homosexuality, by contrast, is a to•eiv•âhꞋ. Whatever your temptations, you are innocent until you translate the temptation into action. That's the exercise of your free will. The homosexual is no exception. Temptations, as long as they are rejected, carry no guilt.
When an individual succumbs to any of these a•veir•otꞋ of úÌåÉøÈä, however, then the aveir•âhꞋ of úÌåÉøÈä contaminates that person, making him or her tâm•eiꞋ; "everyone who does these things," is a to•eiv•âhꞋ to é--ä. The individual must be kept distinct from temptations. No individual, however, can be considered distinct from his or her behavior and practice.
The individual who resists temptations to aveir•âhꞋ of úÌåÉøÈä is defined by his or her behavior, not what tempts them.
Identically, the transgressor is defined by his or her aveir•âhꞋ of úÌåÉøÈä—their behavior, which is, and renders him or her, a to•eiv•âhꞋ to é--ä, until the violations of úÌåÉøÈä—the practice—ceases through tᵊshuv•âhꞋ. The transgressor cannot be considered apart from his or her practice, and that is the part which isn't compatible with the notion of loving the to•eiv•âhꞋ to é--ä. If the to•eiv•âhꞋ to é--ä will make tᵊshuv•âhꞋ then he or she is no longer a to•eiv•âhꞋ to é--ä. It is one's practice which defines the person. If, and as long as, one's practice is a to•eiv•âhꞋ to é--ä then that person is a to•eiv•âhꞋ to é--ä.
We can sometimes see the 'Tonight Show' on the Internet a few days later here in Israel. Lately (for us), Leno has been spoofing the psychomancers who excuse Clinton's conduct "because his mother and grandmother didn't get along."
Shyster lawyer Jackie Chiles (Seinfeld, actor Phil Morris) |
Leno's spoofs of such lame excuses are funny precisely because such psycho-speak—loving / compassion for the sinners—has become pervasive in the American society that now has the money and leisure time for individuals to fret over, and spend their non-essential money on, their psychological foibles. As they become richer, Israel and other countries are following close behind. Criminal insanity is probably more rare among poor nations where they haven't the excess wealth or leisure to fret over their mental health (or lawyers to make such excuses stick)—and dream up such Freudianisms to excuse criminal behavior. Excusing a predator's behavior for some childhood Freudianism, short-circuiting compassion properly directed toward the victim(s), has become an American obsession exemplified from sports celeb (O.J. Simpson) to abuse of power over a subordinate and lying under oath by President Clinton.
What does úÌåÉøÈä say? In one phrase: personal integrity and responsibility (Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 24.16). This also implies focusing compassion on the victim(s), not (!) the predator.
If either or both, the American and Israeli society, would begin to focus their compassion on victims instead of making excuses for predators—excuses that are nothing more than such silly psycho-speak that they make the Leno show—it would have a significant effect in curbing crime.
America boasts about its adversarial (Hebrew Sâ•tânꞋ), not justice (Hebrew tzëdꞋëq, legal system. The so-called pundits ask how tragedies like Columbine happen. Looking at the precedent-setting celebs and leaders, predators with wealth to manipulate the adversarial system to their advantage, the only intelligent question is why it's any surprise. As O.J. Simpson demonstrated, the adversarial system is predator-biased at its core. What khutzpâh to be surprised when the system grows predators?
22:2— Talking with my yᵊshiv•âhꞋ friend in Beit ha-KᵊnësꞋët last ùÑÇáÌÈú, I had looked up some new words in Hebrew to explain that, as a scientist, I cannot îÄúÀòÇìÌÅí òÅãåÌú.
Imagine my surprise to find that úÌåÉøÈä also focuses on one of these words at the center of a pivotal phrase in this week's pâ•râsh•âhꞋ:
22.3 – ìÉà úåÌëÇì ìÀäÄúÀòÇìÌÅí
"This applies to every case where one's physical or verbal intervention can help someone avoid a loss" (Artscroll Tan"kh).
An example occurred on my way home from Beit-ha-KᵊnësꞋët in the darkness after Havdâl•âhꞋ. I noticed a young woman standing astride a bicycle in the middle of the road talking to the driver of a stopped van. She was in harm's way, apparently unaware that, though she could see the cars well, the drivers couldn't see her very well.
I figured she would be offended if I said anything to her, and so said nothing. According to this passage, however, it was a mi•tzᵊw•âhꞋ that I apprise her of her risk of loss—in this case injury or death. I should have risked her rebuke, and weathered it if necessary, to warn her of the danger she was in. Bâ•rukhꞋ é--ä, she was not involved in an accident—this time.
We are responsible for our brothers and sisters (fellow úÌåÉøÈä-keepers). This is an extension of the mi•tzᵊw•âhꞋ to love our fellow as ourself. While we cannot become so meddlesome that others avoid us, it is a mi•tzᵊw•âhꞋ that we must use our good sense, prudently, to help others avoid loss when we reasonably can.
24.2— The English reads: "And when [the woman who has been given a gët, writ of divorce] is departed from his house, she may go and be another man's wife."
At first read, RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa seems to contradict this teaching (NHM 19.8-9):
"He said to them, 'Mosh•ëhꞋ made it îÀôÇúËçÇ for you to release your women due to your hardheartedness, but it was not thus from the primacy. I tell you that everyone who abandons his woman, if it isn't [due to] her adultery, and takes another [without giving the estranged wife a gët], is [culpable for the estranged woman's potential future] adultery; and he who takes the estranged woman causes adultery." (For a discussion of this teaching relative to the Biblical practice of polygyny, cf. NHM note 19.9.1.)
Thus, nearly 2,000 years ago, RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa taught the solution for agunot ("anchored-women" [abandoned women whose estranged husbands refuse to give them a gët]).
The difficulty here is magnified in the English "may," for which the dictionary gives multiple meanings:
Permission—a mother may give permission to her child, "You may (do thus and so),"
Contingency—"They died that we may be free," or
Possibility—"it may rain."
Contingency is merely a type of possibility. That "they died" doesn't necessarily imply that "we shall be free," only that the possibility of the occurrence of freedom exists.
In the Hebrew, however, this phrase in 24.2-3a reads: åÀäÈìÀëÈä åÀäÈéÀúÈä ìÀàÄéùÑ-àÇçÅø: 3 åÌùÒÀðÅàÈäÌ…
Beginning with the first pâ•suqꞋ of përꞋëq 24, this is a series of contingent "ifs" (or "ands"): for (if) a man marries, and (if) he doesn't like her any more, and (if) he gives her a gët, and (if) she then remarries, and (if) the second husband doesn't like her either, and (even if) the second husband gives her a gët, then the first husband still cannot remarry her.
Nowhere in this is there any permission, even implicitly, for a divorced woman to remarry. Only the acknowledgment that, though úÌåÉøÈä doesn't ordain remarriage for a divorced woman – just as Tor•âhꞋ doesn't ordain divorce in the first place, nevertheless, such sometimes occur despite úÌåÉøÈä. When these happen, real life contingencies must provide for the maintenance of social order in these cases as well. In the case that all of these eventualities occurred (surely another example of a rabbinic test question being posed to RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa), the first husband was prohibited from taking her back again.
In answering this rabbinic exercise, however, RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa has taught the ancient solution to the problem of a•gun•otꞋ: the man who abandons his wife and withholds a geit from her is held equally responsible and accountable with her by the Beit-Din for any future adultery on her part! In such case, he becomes complicit, along with her and her paramour, in her adultery – which was a capital offense.
This is another instance in which Nᵊtzâr•imꞋ Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ, based on the teaching of RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa as best we can reconstruct it today, is stricter than, historically more faithful to Har Sin•aiꞋ, and clearly superior to all other sects of Judaism.
úÌåÉøÈä explicitly forbids a Ko•heinꞋ ha-Ja•dolꞋ from marrying a gᵊrush•âhꞋ (divorced woman, wa-Yi•qᵊr•âꞋ 21.7, 14). RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa appears to have had in mind that, while this was required in Tor•âhꞋ shë-bi•khᵊtâvꞋ only for the Ko•heinꞋ ha-Ja•dolꞋ, it embodied the ideal paradigm, to be reflected in the Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ, for all Yᵊhud•imꞋ in aspiring to the prophecy of Shᵊm•otꞋ 19.6. (Consequently, this would be applicable only to "the "Realm of Kohan•imꞋ," i.e., Yᵊhud•imꞋ, and not to the geir•imꞋ who constitute the "holy goy.")
The proviso "based on the teaching of RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa, as best we can reconstruct it today" is especially important relative to this passage. The subsequent passage, regarding celibacy, is not only vague but a particularly suspect topic for later, Christian, redaction. The controversy over whether the Qum•rânꞋ Kha•sid•imꞋ Bᵊn-Tzâ•doqꞋ Tzᵊdoq•imꞋ taught celibacy continues to rage, with no firm conclusions in sight. Thus, even though some early rabbinic Sages were celibates, no precedent has yet been found in first century Judaism for a doctrine of celibacy.
Readers of NHM will note that, in addition to א, β, a-3, and Syp—all ca. C.E. 399 (the earliest extant mss.)—pâ•suqꞋ 9 is also supported by papyrus p-25 (ca. 300-399). While p-25 offers additional textual support, it is still a 4th century witness that is Greek (reflecting the Roman Hellenist-Christian transition), and two centuries after the Christianizing redactions of the mss. had begun.
Just as pampering predators has fostered an epidemic of violent crime in the adult population of the U.S., pampering juvenile predators has catapulted violent crime among US juveniles into a vexing plague in the U.S. Yet, úÌåÉøÈä foresaw this problem millennia ago and provided the solution—Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 21.18-21.
The pivotal adjectives in pᵊsuq•imꞋ 18 & 20 are ñåÉøÅø åÌîåÉøÆä. A note to the Soncino Tal•mudꞋ (Ma•sëkꞋët Mak•otꞋ 5a) finds a connection between ñÈøÇø and ñåÌø
îåÉøÆä in these pᵊsuq•imꞋ should not be confused with the identically spelled and pronounced îåÉøÆä. The primary meaning, in Biblical Hebrew, of éÈøÈä was to sling or hurl an arrow or spear. In modern Hebrew, this verb has evolved to connote shooting a firearm. A secondary meaning of éÈøÈä, however, is to instruct – perhaps in the sense of shooting information that penetrates students. úÌåÉøÈä is the hiph•ilꞋ verbal f.n. of éÈøÈä. The shorꞋësh of îåÉøÆä in this week's pâ•râsh•âhꞋ, however, is îÈøÈä. Contrast this with the unrelated term for "rebel": îÈøÇã.
These pᵊsuq•imꞋ go on to describe a youth (i.e., pre-Bar-Mitz•wâhꞋ ) of a Tor•âhꞋ household, that not only seethes in habitual willful mutiny against authority, but also demonstrates his incorrigibility after attempts by both parents to discipline him.
The Mish•nâhꞋ to Ma•sëkꞋët Sunedrion 68b clarifies the halakhic interpretation. "A son who is ñåÉøÅø åÌîåÉøÆä": When does he become liable to the penalty of a son who is ñåÉøÅø åÌîåÉøÆä? From the time that he produces two [genital] hairs until he grows a beard right round (by which is meant the hair of the genitals, not that of the face, but that the sages spoke in polite terms [cf. also Ma•sëkꞋët Yᵊvâm•otꞋ 80a; Ma•sëkꞋët Nid•âhꞋ 52a]), for it is written, If a man have a son who is ñåÉøÅø åÌîåÉøÆä, 'a son' but not a daughter; 'a son' but not a full-grown man. While a pre-Bar-Mi•tzᵊw•âhꞋ is exempt, since he does not come within the scope of the mi•tzᵊw•otꞋ." In the case of a pre-Bar-Mi•tzᵊw•âhꞋ, the parents are held liable for the penalties arising from their son's actions—strong motivation to take an active interest in the proper raising and disciplining of one's sons.
To avoid camouflaging child abuse, specific criteria were stipulated. pâ•suqꞋ 20 stipulates that the wayward son has been found to be a æåÉìÅì åÀñÉáÅà (not to be confused with ñÇáÌÈà).
Based on Mi•shᵊl•eiꞋ Shᵊlom•oh′ 23.20, this was related specifically to wine (especially , according to Klein's, to sesame or to non-Israeli—particularly Italian—wine) and meat. In order to have a son declared æåÉìÅì åÀñÉáÅà, parents had to prove before the Beit-Din charges that their son consumed wine and meat immoderately, constituting æåÉìÅì åÀñÉáÅà (Ma•sëkꞋët Sunedrion 70a). Clearly, this also encompassed dependence on intoxicants and, by extension, this should now include illicit drugs.
The Mish•nâhꞋ also states "If his father desires [to have him punished], but not his mother; or the reverse, he is not treated as ñåÉøÅø åÌîåÉøÆä unless they both desire it (Ma•sëkꞋët Sunedrion 71a). This, too, is a wise safeguard against child abuse – in addition to the requirement that the youth be brought to the Beit Din, not sentenced to such punishment by his parents only.
Also in Ma•sëkꞋët Sunedrion 71a, however, the Sages of Tal•mudꞋ argued that, based on pâ•suqꞋ 21, the mother's voice must sound like the father's voice—and, therefore (non sequitur!), the mother must look like the father—in order for a son to be declared ñåÉøÅø åÌîåÉøÆä. Hence, they argue, no son has ever been, nor can ever be, declared ñåÉøÅø åÌîåÉøÆä. According to these commentators, the pâ•suqꞋ was written merely to be studied for its own reward. Why such "interpreters" are regarded as Sages, and who could regard them as such, escapes me.
The Nᵊtzâr•imꞋ reject this elimination of a mi•tzᵊw•âhꞋ in contravention of Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 13.1 et al. Contravening Tor•âhꞋ shë-bi•khᵊtâvꞋ can never be valid Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ. A note to the Soncino Tal•mudꞋ informs that "our voice" is singular. By áÌÀ÷ÉìÅðåÌ ("in our voice"), úÌåÉøÈä clearly means that the parents must be in agreement, one voice (i.e., of one accord), in the matter.
Based on the same usage in Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 22.18: åÀéÄñÌÀøåÌ àÉúåÉ
"They" is understood to imply the zᵊqan•imꞋ of the Beit-Din (Ma•sëkꞋët Συνεδριον 71b). It is clear from this that the discplining referred to is, therefore, lashes (cf. also Ma•sëkꞋët Kᵊtub•otꞋ 46a). So, before a son could be declared ñåÉøÅø åÌîåÉøÆä, he already had to have been punished by lashes by the Beit-Din, demonstrating by his continuing refusal to make tᵊshuv•âhꞋ even after lashes from the Beit-Din; that, despite all reasonable attempts, he remains incorrigible.
This teaching is further refined in Tal•mudꞋ (Ma•sëkꞋët Sot•âhꞋ 25a): "Come and hear: R. Yo•shiꞋyëh said: Three things did Zë•ir•âꞋ tell me as emanating from the men of éÀøåÌùÑÈìÇéÄí: If a husband retracted his warning the warning is retracted; if a Beit-Din wished to pardon a za•qeinꞋ who rebelled [against their mi•shᵊpâtꞋ] they may pardon him; and if the parents wished to forgive a ñåÉøÅø åÌîåÉøÆä son they may forgive him. When, however, I came to my colleagues in the South, they agreed with me in respect of two but did not agree with me in respect of the rebellious za•qeinꞋ, so that disputes should not multiply in Israel." From this we learn that even at the final moment before stoning, the ñåÉøÅø åÌîåÉøÆä could make tᵊshuv•âhꞋ and be forgiven.
In these teachings of úÌåÉøÈä lies not only the solution to the burgeoning problem of violent crimes among juveniles but the solution to some of the ills of America's "adversarial" legal system.
22.1— "Upon seeing your brother's ox or sheep stray you shall not disappear [from the scene]. You shall return them to your brother."
How relevant this is today! This teaches us that we are responsible for our brother, that we are our brother's keeper. This is what Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ is all about, applying úÌåÉøÈä in real life today. úÌåÉøÈä gives a paradigm here that we are to apply in our everyday life with our fellow Yᵊhud•imꞋ.
If the sheep of a sister, i.e. fellow Yᵊhudi(t), strayed, instead of a brother's as Tor•âhꞋ shë-bi•khᵊtâvꞋ specified, should an intelligent person conclude they are exempt from responsibility based on such a technicality? That would be like a murderer being set free even when the whole world knows he is guilty because of a technicality – e.g., O.J. Simpson and a couple of other Hollywood celebs, dating back to the early 1980s. That's "politically correct" in modern western society, which favors the affluent who can better manipulate the "system," but it isn't just. Perhaps it is the "technicality mentality" that prevents modern westerners from relating to úÌåÉøÈä, for without Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ, úÌåÉøÈä can, at best, be revered only selectively. úÌåÉøÈä cannot be revered in truth except as reverence is demonstrated in obedience—non-selective obedience (as contrasted with Displacement Theology).
Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ explores here what responsibilities the custodian of the lost property has and the limits of his liability before úÌåÉøÈä. Surely the finder who takes protective custody of lost property cannot destroy it for amusement or spite? Where is the line drawn. Perhaps more importantly, how is the line drawn and by whom ?
Forerunners (1964-66, Zweibrucken, Germany, France, Belgium, radio program on Canadian Forces Network) |
Here is a real-life example from my past. (Of course, since neither of us were even Jews and had no knowledge of Judaism, this case was never referred to a Beit-Din.) When I was in the USAF in Germany I was the keyboard player in a rock band—the Forerunners. One night I loaned my microphone to our drummer and lead singer, who was sitting-in that night with another group. A couple of days later I asked him if he had finished with my mike. He replied that he had returned the mike, leaving it on my bunk—which was in plain sight in the barracks where many airmen freely mulled about.
I never got the mike. I complained that he had not returned the mike to me and, indeed, that he had been negligent in leaving it in plain sight where it had obviously been stolen and his negligence caused the loss of the mike. Who should have paid for the mike? Though we negotiated an agreement to this simple example, this is the kind of real-life question that ancient Bat•eiꞋ-Din had to adjudicate, that comprise the mi•shᵊpât•imꞋ and the kind of question that occupies the student of Tal•mudꞋ and Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ today—just as it also does law classes in modern universities.
Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ recorded the precedent governing that case over a millennium ago. It's covered in Tal•mudꞋ, Ma•sëkꞋët Bâv•âꞋ Qam•âꞋ 56b, 57a, et al. Does the person taking protective custody of the property assume the liability of an unpaid bailee, falling within the purview of the law of Shᵊm•otꞋ 22.6-8? Or of a paid bailee falling within the purview of the law of Shᵊm•otꞋ 22.9-12? These are the kinds of questions that occupy zᵊqan•imꞋ / Sho•phᵊt•imꞋ of a Beit-Din.
Consider Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 25.12.
If a woman's husband is in danger of being killed and she rescues him by striking the perpetrator in the genitals, does úÌåÉøÈä advocate cutting off her hand?
Gᵊmâr•âꞋ (Ma•sëkꞋët Bâv•âꞋ Qam•âꞋ 28a) likens her hand to the hand of an officer of the Beit-Din. The question revolved around her use of force, not the specifics of striking in the genitals (of course, that's where!). That was a given. How else would an unarmed woman of inferior strength be expected to attack a man? The question wasn't how or where she attacked (in the genitals) but rather whether her resorting to force was required to save her husband.
Focusing on the question of whether she was justified in resorting to force, the rabbis asked, Would an officer of the Beit-Din, had he been present, have been justified in using force to save the husband. Perhaps another way should have been found without resorting to force.
If there was no other way of rescuing her husband except to resort to force, then her hand is likened to the hand of an officer of the Beit-Din, as if she were carrying out the mi•shᵊpâtꞋ of the Beit-Din. If she was not justified in resorting to force then her action couldn't be regarded as the "hand of an officer of the Beit-Din. This decision amounted to her hand having been "cut off" from legal approval—and the proof is that she was penalized with a monetary fine (for assault), not having her hand, literally, cut off.
22.11 — You shall not wear ùÑÇòÇèÀðÅæ
Like the tzitz•iy•otꞋ that is attached to the four corners of our garment, having a pᵊtilꞋ tᵊkheilꞋët to remind us to keep the mi•tzᵊw•otꞋ, ùÑÇòÇèÀðÅæ also has significance beyond our clothing and the upholstery, carpets, drapes and other fabrics in our homes and automobiles.
There are seven letters in the SeiphꞋër Tor•âhꞋ that are "honored" with crownlets. These letters are: ùòèð"æ â"õ. The sages have been silent regarding the obvious importance of these seven letters that are awarded special ornamentation in the SeiphꞋër Tor•âhꞋ because they have never understood the significance. Yet, they are memorized as given in the two acronyms here. The first is explained above. The second is the acronym for âÌÅø öÆãÆ÷
These special seven letters with crownlets, along with the prohibition in this passage, is a cryptic reminder – every time the SeiphꞋër Tor•âhꞋ is read, every time any of these letters is encountered – against admitting a Geir tzëdꞋëq who is less than fully compatible, a mixture syncretizing remnants of his or her native religion with úÌåÉøÈä.
Havdâl•âhꞋ Tei•mân•itꞋ (Ha•dasꞋ is the spice; no European "castle spice box." While a sprig of myrtle is preferred, any fragrant herb or spice will suffice.) |
This is also reinforced by the association of wool with common garments as contrasted with linen for the officiating garments of the Kohan•imꞋ. This line of thinking is confirmed in the many instances in which úÌåÉøÈä clearly delineates between ÷ÉãÆùÑ versus, lᵊ-hav•dilꞋ, khol.
There is no overlap, merging or mixing of the two. Hav•dâl•âhꞋ between ÷ÉãÆùÑ and the khol, between light and darkness, between Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ and the other kindreds and between ùÑÇáÌÈú and the weekdays is a theme reinforced every ùÑÇáÌÈú in the seiꞋdër Havdâl•âhꞋ.
Setting: ca. B.C.E. 720 (Yᵊsha•yâhꞋu chapters 40-66). Location: éÀøåÌùÑÈìÇéÄí (31° 47' N, 35° 13' E) |
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pâ•suqꞋ 54.3
åÀæÇøÀòÅêÀ âÌåÉéÄí éÄéøÈùÑ
Unfortunately playing into the hands of misojudaics, both the Stone Edition and Koren Bibles wrongly translate this as "your seed shall inherit nations."
That isn't how the Hebrew Scriptures read.
The Hebrew term for 'nations' is ìÀàËîÌÄéí, not âÌåÉéÄí.
The misojudaic phobia about Jews gaining control and power of nations from the top isn't instructed in úÌåÉøÈä. Consequently, the phobia most publicized by misojudaics isn't a goal of úÌåÉøÈä-keeping Jews.
To the contrary, Yᵊsha•yâhꞋu ha-Nâ•viꞋ alludes to the prophecy in Shᵊm•otꞋ 19.5-6 regarding true (not Christianity's pretend "spiritual") Israel: "I shall have you for a kingdom of Kohan•imꞋ, AND [i.e., in addition I shall also have] a goy qâ•doshꞋ." ("Shall be to / for Me" is an Hebrew idiom meaning "I shall have.")
Artscroll Stone Edition Ta•na"khꞋ |
The phrase "and a goy qâ•doshꞋ" refers to the many goy•imꞋ who will commit, before a Pᵊrush•imꞋ-heritage Bat•eiꞋ-Din in Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ, to follow úÌåÉøÈä according to logical Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ through the mechanism of ni•lᵊw•ëhꞋ, documented from the time of the Yᵊtzi•âhꞋ (bᵊ-Mi•dᵊbarꞋ 18.4) through the nᵊviy•imꞋ (Yᵊsha•yâhꞋu ha-Nâ•viꞋ 14.1 & Zᵊkhar•yâhꞋ Bën-Bë•rëkh•yâhꞋ Bën-Id•oꞋ ha-Nâ•viꞋ 2.15—if you find this reference at 2.11 then you're using an extensively apostasized, misojudaic, false-bible. Obtain a real, Jewish Bible—which is Hebrew—with English translation from Artscroll).
It's absolutely clear even from the most simple logic that neither the genuine attachment to Israel of bᵊ-Mi•dᵊbarꞋ 18.4 nor the stipulation of Yᵊsha•yâhꞋu 54.3 can be realized through substitutes pretending to be Yi•sᵊr•â•eilꞋ. There is only the choice between either pretend religions of Displacement Theology of the pagan Roman Hellenists or, lᵊ-hav•dilꞋ, attachment to Pᵊrush•imꞋ-heritage Judaism and the State of Israel.
The Nᵊtzâr•imꞋ are the only followers of RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa as the Mâ•shiꞋakh recognized in the Pᵊrush•imꞋ-heritage Jewish community and the State of Israel. Moreover, in the Pᵊrush•imꞋ-heritage Jewish community only the Nᵊtzâr•imꞋ recognize the Biblical and Talmudic definition of geir•imꞋ non-Jews in this prophesied role. For these reasons, the Nᵊtzâr•imꞋ are the only opportunity for non-Jews following RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa as the Mâ•shiꞋakh to find a place in Israel, in these prophecies and gain a place in hâ-ol•âmꞋ ha-baꞋ.
The resulting effort to bring the Light of úÌåÉøÈä to the goy•imꞋ must be compatible with that prophecy—aimed at bringing the illumination of úÌåÉøÈä to the goy•imꞋ (people's hearts), not reliance upon human political and financial power garnered among the lᵊum•imꞋ.
This demonstrates yet again the invaluable, essential and irreplaceable need for you to to relate to, and depend exclusively upon, the Word of é--ä, which is only the Hebrew Scriptures, directly, rather than rely upon man (the translators). Get started today in our Khav•rutꞋâ Distance Learning, which includes taking an approved on-line Hebrew course.
Nᵊviy•imꞋ | Translation | Mid•râshꞋ RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa: NHM | NHM | ||||||||
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Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 21.18-20 | If a man will have a stubborn and rebellious son, who won't hearken, to the voice of his father or the voice of his mother; and they chasten him, but he won't hearken to them, 19 Then his father and his mother shall seize him, and expel him; to the zᵊqan•imꞋ of his ir and to the gate of his place; 20 and they shall say to the zᵊqan•imꞋ of his ir: "This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he does not hearken to our voices; [he is a] useless glutton and a wino |
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21.20 | 22 And for [when] there shall be in a man, a kheit, a capital mish•pâtꞋ and he is executed; and he is hanged on an eitz, 23 His corpse shall not hang on the eitz, because you shall absolutely bury him in that day, because a qᵊ•lâl•âhꞋ of Ël•oh•imꞋ is hanging; and you shall not make your adâm•âhꞋ tâ•meiꞋ, which 'ä your Ël•oh•imꞋ gave you as a possession. | Toward evening, a wealthy man 8.20.1 from Ran•tisꞋ 27.57.1 named Yo•seiphꞋ,27.57.2 who was himself also a tal•midꞋ 27.57.3 of RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa, having come near to Pilate, requested 21.22.1 the body of RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa.27.58.1 Then Pilate ordered it 27.58.2 to be rendered to him. | 27.57-58 | ||||||||
Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 22.12 | Plaited-extensions shall you make for yourself; on the four wings of your covering with which you cover yourself. |
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You’ve heard the Oral Law concerning:5.43.1 ‘And you shall love 5.43.2 your companion 5.43.3 as yourself’ (wa-Yiq•râꞋ 19:18), that this isn't a mitz•wâhꞋ 5.19.1 except as it ensues from companions; that one is permitted to eschew 5.43.4 those who eschew him. However, I say to you ‘Love 5.43.2 those who eschew you,5.44.1 bless those who curse you, render good to those 5.44.2 who wrong you—and wa-tit•pa•lᵊl•uꞋ 5.44.2 for them; and in your doings thusly you will be sons of your Father who is in the heavens.3.2.2 If you will inquire into the well-being of your brother you do a great khësꞋëd.12.7.1 If you love those who love you, where is any payment for you in that? Don't even the goy•imꞋ 5.47.1 do the same? 5.47.2 Therefore be whole 5.48.0 as your Father who is of the heavens 5.48.1 is whole.’ 5.48.0 The above doesn't conflict with Tor•âhꞋ shë-bikh•tâvꞋ when one realizes that the reference to the Mo•âv•imꞋ is by national edict of the MëlꞋëkh or Beit Din hâ-Jâ•dolꞋ, while the above is a guideline for personal relations within the Pᵊrush•iꞋ -heritage Jewish community. These guidelines should be extended outside of the Jewish community to the extent that they don't contradict guidelines of Tor•âhꞋ shë-bikh•tâvꞋ. Further, even those who weren't permitted to come in the qâ•hâlꞋ for 10 generations could become geir•imꞋ and be treated as described above. |
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Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 23.19 | You shall not bring the giving for a promiscuous-woman or the price of a dog to Beit 'ä your Ël•oh•imꞋ, for any vow, for both of them are a to•eiv•âhꞋ of 'ä, your Ël•oh•imꞋ. | (Then Yᵊhud•âhꞋ Bën-Shim•onꞋ, Ish Qᵊrai•yotꞋ,10.4.2 who delivered him over, having seen that he was being sentenced,27.3.1 he began to shuv tᵊshuv•âhꞋ,27.3.2 and returned the thirty silver shᵊqal•imꞋ 26.15.1 to the predominantly aristocratic, Hellenist-Roman Pseudo-Tzᵊdoq•iꞋ 3.7.2 Ko•heinꞋ Gâ•dolꞋ 2.4.1 and Zᵊqan•imꞋ-serving-on-the-Beit Din of the am 27.3.3 saying, “I misstepped,1.21.4 delivering over innocent blood.” 27.4.1 They said, “What is that to us? You see to yourself.” Having thrown the thirty 27.5.1 silver shᵊqal•imꞋ 26.15.1 into the Beit ha-Miq•dâshꞋ,4.5.2 he retired and, having gone off, he hung himself.) The Hellenist-Roman Pseudo-Tzᵊdoq•imꞋ 3.7.2 Chief Kohan•imꞋ,2.4.1 having received 21.22.3 the silver shᵊqal•imꞋ 26.15.1 said, “One should not 12.2.1 toss them into the treasury store-chamber for tᵊrum•otꞋ in the Beit ha-Miq•dâshꞋ 27.6.1 because it is the price of blood.” 27.6.2 Then, having convened 21.22.3 a Beit Din,27.1.2 they bought the field of a yo•tzeirꞋ of clay,27.7.1 for a cemetery for geir•imꞋ.25.31.1 Wherefore, that field is called "Tent-of-Blood Field" 27.8.1 to this day. Then the saying through Zᵊkhar•yâhꞋ 27.9.1 (11:12-13) was fulfilled 5.17.3 which says
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Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 23.26 | When you come into the standing grain of your fellow, you may pluck rubbings with your hand, but you may not lift a sickle against the standing grain of your fellow. | In that season,12.1.0 RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa went here and there on Shab•âtꞋ.12.1.1 His tal•mid•imꞋ 5.1.1 were hungry and started to pick up ìÆ÷Æè of grain and crumble them between their palms 12.1.2 and eat them. On seeing them,12.2.0 the Qum•rânꞋ-Essene-Tzᵊdoq•imꞋ sect of Judaism 12.2.2 said, “Look, your tal•mid•imꞋ 5.1.1 are doing something that no one should do 12.2.1 on Shab•âtꞋ.” 12.2.2 RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa said to them,12.3.0 “Haven't you read what Dâ•widꞋ did when he was hungry, and those with him? 12.3.1 Coming to the House of é‑‑ä 12.4.0 he ate the Display Bread 12.4.1 which he, and those with him, weren't 12.2.1 allowed to eat. It was only for Kohan•imꞋ 2.4.1 alone. Or haven't you studied 12.5.0 what is written in úÌåÉøÈä,5.17.1 that the Kohan•imꞋ 2.4.1 officiate on Shab•âtꞋ 12.1.1 just as they do on days that are khol 12.5.1—without guilt.12.5.2 Ä•meinꞋ! I tell you that such is he who is greater than the Miq•dâshꞋ.12.6.1 If you 12.7.0 knew what Ho•sheiꞋa 6:6 is: you wouldn’t convict the innocent,12.7.2 because â•donꞋ 22.43.2 of the person is even moreso [â•donꞋ] over Shab•âtꞋ,” 12.8.1 Halâkh•âhꞋ permits the hand-hulling of grain on Shab•âtꞋ for the purpose of eating a scanty meal as long as it is done in an unusual way to demonstrate that one is not reaping. According to Tal•mudꞋ, “We have learned elsewhere [ma•as•rotꞋ 4.5], He who hulls barley, may hull it grain by grain and eat it; but if he hulls it and lays [the grains] in his hand, he is liable [to tithe it, since it is regarded as a full meal]. Said R. ËlâzârꞋ: And it is likewise with respect to Shab•âtꞋ. But this is not so! For Rab’s wife hulled for him cupfuls, and likewise R. Hiyya’s wife hulled cupfuls for him! Rather, if this [statement of R. ËlâzârꞋ] has been said, it was said with respect to the second clause: He who rubs ears of wheat may winnow them from one hand to the other and eat them; but if he winnows them and lays them on his lap he is liable [to tithe it]. Said R. ËlâzârꞋ: And it is likewise with respect to Shab•âtꞋ” (Ma•sëkꞋët Beitz•âhꞋ 13b; NHM note 12.2.2. Since Tal•mudꞋ confirms Yᵊho•shuꞋa's position, a priori, those who were arguing against him were Tzᵊdoq•imꞋ or the hated Hellenist-Boethusian (Roman-collaborating) sect of Pᵊrush•imꞋ, not mainstream Pᵊrush•imꞋ. |
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Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 24.14 | Do not exploit the destitute or ëv•yonꞋ employee; from your brothers or your geir•imꞋ, who are in your land, in your gate. | Then, at dusk, the â•donꞋ 22.43.2 of the vineyard said to his assistant, ‘Call the workers and render their payments,20.8.1 beginning from the last ones unto the first ones.’ | 20.8 | ||||||||
Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 25.5 | When brother live together, and one of them dies without a son, the woman of the deceased, shall not [go] outside [of the family] to a strange man; her yâ•vâmꞋ shall come upon her and take her to him, for a woman and and yi•beimꞋ.' | During that day, those from the aristocratic, Hellenist-Roman Pseudo-Tzᵊdoq•imꞋ sect of Judaism 3.7.2 (who say there is no enlivening from the dead)22.23.1 came near to him and questioned 17.10.2 him saying, “RibꞋi,23.7.1 Mosh•ëhꞋ said (Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 25:5),
Now there were seven brothers among us. The first married and died without having a son and left 22.25.1 his wife to his brother. Likewise also the second and the third… unto the seventh. Last of all, the woman died.22.27.1 So, since she has already been with all of them, whose wife will she be in the enlivening?” Replying, RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa said to them, “Seeing neither the Scriptures nor the force 26.64.2 of Ël•oh•imꞋ, you wander off in all directions.22.29.1 For in the enlivening they neither marry nor are they married,22.30.1 but rather they are as the messengers 1.20.1 of Ël•oh•imꞋ in the heavens.3.2.2 Concerning the enlivening of the dead, have you not read what was spoken to you by é‑‑ä 1.22.1 saying (Shᵊm•otꞋ 3:6): ‘I am the Ël•oh•imꞋ of your father, the Ël•oh•imꞋ of Av•râ•hâmꞋ, the Ël•oh•imꞋ of Yitz•khâqꞋ and the Ël•oh•imꞋ of Ya•a•qovꞋ.’ It doesn't say that He was Ël•oh•imꞋ—i.e., of the dead; but rather is—of the living.” Having heard, the qᵊhil•otꞋ 4.25.1 were astonished at his teaching.7.28.1 See, for example, the physics' perspective in Scientific American: Is time an illusion? Given that everything we see, touch or otherwise sense comprise atoms, which, in turn, comprise quarks, which are mere forces, everything in our real world is nothing more than a projection of forces that we are able to perceive as "real." Outside of this projection—our universe—time has no meaning. Nor has any physical dimension. A fortiori, in the eternity that transcends our physical universe, there is nothing physical—including time. Nothing physical implies no physical body, no sex, no marriage. Contemplating eternity requires considering existence without vocal cords, sounds, eyes, sights, nor any of our other physical senses—a starkly different existence. Yet, it is these considerations in which we must invest our spiritual assets (developing our dimensionless nëphꞋësh and ruꞋakh, and learning how to use them to relate to the dimensionless nëphꞋësh and ruꞋakh of others) to appreciate eternity. |
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Yᵊsha•yâhꞋu 54.3, 9 | For right and left shall you burst forth; and your seed shall inherit goy•imꞋ, and they shall settle desolate cities. 9 For this is the Mei NoꞋakh to Me… | Yet, as it was in yᵊm•eiꞋ NoꞋakh,24.37.1 so shall it be in the Shᵊkhin•âhꞋ 24.27.2 of the bën-â•dâmꞋ.24.27.3 For so they were in the days that were before the Ma•bulꞋ—eating and drinking, being fruitful and multiplying,24.38.1 until the day NoꞋakh went into the box. They did not know until the Ma•bulꞋ came and picked them all up. Thus shall the Shᵊkhin•âhꞋ 24.27.2 of the bën-â•dâmꞋ 8.20.2 also be.24.27.3 | 24.37 |
Setting: ca. 29 C.E. Location: Northwest shore of Yâm Ki•nërꞋët |
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Yâm Ki•nërꞋët viewed from the summit of the Mount of Discourse, just north of Tᵊvëryâh (Hellenist "Tiberius"). Photographed © 1983 by Yi•rᵊmᵊyâhꞋu Bën-Dâ•widꞋ. |
The úÌåÉøÈä section (5765) discusses the prohibition against mixing plantings in a vineyard, one of a number of prohibited mixing of species. RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa also addressed the symbolism associated with the issue of mixing species (NHM 13.24-30 & 36-43).
Given the tax situation in the 1st century C.E., one of the ways a farmer could take out his anger on a neighboring farmer after some dispute was to go into the field some night during the planting season and sow the field with the least profitable crop possible—hay grass. The victim farmer would have to pay taxes on two crops plus suffer a loss in profits from the resulting damage to the crop he had planted.
For a large congregation to gather on a large hillside on the northwestern shore of Yâm Ki•nërꞋët, it was most likely one of the intermediate days of a Khag (since these get-away retreats – in the modern era, often (inaccurately) called ùÑÇáÌÈúåÉï – often lasted more than one day and people would otherwise have been working). Thus, it was spring or fall and the weather was conducive. Followers of the dynamic young Pᵊrushi RibꞋi with uncommon widsom had passed the word through the Bat•eiꞋ-ha-KᵊnësꞋët in the area that he would be giving a series of teachings for a khag get-away ùÑÇáÌÈúåÉï.
Model of 1st-century Gâ•lilꞋ boat showing lateen sail, oars, decks (bow & stern) and twin tillers that could be connected to be controlled by one helmsman. |
Sitting on the hillside with the early afternoon sun slightly to their backs, looking down toward the water, they listened to the exciting young RibꞋi standing in the boat, who explained úÌåÉøÈä and its Oral Law with a refreshing, unparalleled straightforwardness using clear, unassailable, common-sense logic.
The RibꞋi spoke from a 1st-century boat anchored to a rock on the shore; its sail down, flapping lazily in the occasional breeze. The congregation was so enthralled that, between sentences, the quietness allowed those sitting down the hill closest to the water to hear the small waves lapping against the side of the boat, punctuated by the occasional shriek of the children playing higher up the hill. Everyone was eager to hear what the hottest new celebrity-RibꞋi in Israel would have to say about the Roman occupation, how it would end, what they should do about it, how they should deal with the Roman occupiers and the Ko•han•eiꞋ hâ-RëshꞋa, Hellenist sycophants of the Roman occupiers, who had taken over the Beit-ha-Mi•qᵊdâshꞋ—but no one in that crowd had any inkling that this teaching, on this day, would change the world.
1st-century Gâ•lilꞋ boat discovered in Yâm Ki•nërꞋët in 1986. |
Among his illustrations: "The Realm of the heavens," he said, referring to hâ-ol•âmꞋ ha-baꞋ, "is like a man who sowed good seed in his field. While the persons slept, his enemy came and sowed hay grass overtop, among the wheat," mixing the species, "and went away. When the grass sprouted and produced its fruit, the hay grass also appeared. The slaves of the baꞋ•al of the field, having come near, said to him, 'Adoni, didn't you sow good seed in your field? Then from where does the field have hay grass?' Their âdon reported to them, 'An enemy man did this.' The slaves said to him, 'Then do you wish that we, having gone forth, should glean it out?'"
This would be what everyone in the congregation expected. It would promote the yield of the wheat and eliminate taxes on the hay grass. But RibꞋi Yᵊho•shuꞋa's illustration went in an unexpected direction. " 'No, lest in gleaning out the hay grass you might uproot some of the wheat at the same time. Let them both be, to grow side by side until the harvest; and in the time of the harvest I will say to the harvesters, 'Glean out the haygrass first and bind it into bundles to burn up. Then gather the wheat into my granary.' "
The analogy was so obvious to the young RibꞋi that he didn't consider further explanation necessary. In the Realm of the heavens there is neither taxman nor loss of profits in the heavenly equation. Hay grass is merely hay grass. It can be burned later. But every kernel, on every shaft, of wheat is precious to é--ä.
Later, when he went into the house—probably the house of Shim•onꞋ "KeiphꞋâ" Bar-YonꞋâh, in nearby KᵊpharꞋ Na•khumꞋ (Na•khumꞋ-ville)—his ta•lᵊmid•imꞋ, still perplexed about what the illustration meant, asked him to explain the analogy. His explanation is recorded in NHM 13.36-43.
A man should forever assess himself, in his nëphꞋësh, that he is [at least] mediocre. If he did one mi•tzᵊw•âhꞋ—A•shᵊr•eiꞋ is he, that he earned himself a handful of merit. If he transgressed one aveir•âhꞋ of úÌåÉøÈä—Oy for him, that he earned himself a handful of demerit. And when he thinks this, he should be alert to establish one mi•tzᵊw•âhꞋ and be careful against transgressing a aveir•âhꞋ of úÌåÉøÈä. Also, he should assess the children of the world, that they are [at least] mediocre, for the world depends on it because the world earns either its merit or its demerit.
As we have memorized at the end of Qama of Ma•sëkꞋët Qi•dush•inꞋ (40.2), The Rab•ân•ânꞋ gave, 'Forever a man appears to himself like his worthy half,' etc. as it is sealed in a 'Lamp of the mi•tzᵊw•otꞋ' [one of the lamps of Mᵊnor•atꞋ ha-Mâ•orꞋ by Yi•tzᵊkhâqꞋ Abuhav, section] (à"ìø, Part 2).